1976
Gardner, G. Gail (1976). Attitudes of child health professionals toward hypnosis: Implications for training. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 24, 63-73.
A survey of child health professionals — pediatricians, pediatric nurses, child psychologists, and child psychiatrists — revealed that they have generally positive attitudes toward hypnosis but little knowledge of its specific advantages or applications. Recommendations are made for designing training opportunities in hypnosis which might enhance the probability that the professional will actually use hypnosis or refer a child else where for hypnotherapy.
Gardner, Gail G. (1976). Hypnosis and mastery: Clinical contributions and directions for research. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 24 (3), 202-214.
This paper explores the concept of mastery in relation to hypnotherapy by pulling together clinical observations and suggesting directions for research. It is suggested that a sense of mastery may enhance the effectiveness of hypnosis, either by facilitating induction, or by strengthening hypnotherapeutic suggestions, or by maintaining hypnotherapeutic gains. Moreover, the qustion is raised as to whether hypnotherapy, as compared with other psychotherapeutic approaches, better facilitates the development of a sense of mastery.
1965
Bernstein, Norman R. (1965). Observations on the use of hypnosis with burned children on a pediatric ward. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 13 (1), 1-10.
Several cases are described and observations made about the interplay of forces between staff, patient, and therapist, as well as the expectations of the patients to assess how these factors influenced the use of hypnosis. Hypnosis appears to be a particularly useful means for reaching isolated and depressed children with burns and for improving the morale of the staff team working with these children. The results may be along specific lines in terms of pain tolerance and improved eating, or in general improvement of cooperativeness and mood on the part of the child. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2002 APA, all rights reserved)
Perception
1995
Crawford, Helen J.; Kapelis, Lia; Harrison, David W. (1995). Visual field asymmetry in facial affect perception: Moderating effects of hypnosis, hypnotic susceptibility level, absorption, and sustained attentional abilities. International Journal of Neuroscience, 82 (n1-2), 11-23.
Effects of hypnotic level, affect valence and cerebral asymmetry on reaction time (RT) in the discrimination of Ekman and Friesent (1978) stimuli of angry and happy faces were studied in counterbalanced conditions of waking and hypnosis. Assessed previously on two hypnotic susceptibility scales (Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility; Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale, Form C (SHSS:C)], non-depressed subjects were 16 low (0-4 SHSS:C) and 17 highly (10-12 SHSS:C) hypnotizable, right- handed college students. Subjects were required to identify affect of faces, presented tachistoscopically to left (LVF) or right (RVF) visual fields, by using a forced-choice RT paradigm. Highs were significantly faster than lows in angry and happy affect recognition. Hypnosis had no significant effects. For highs only, angry emotional valence was identified faster when presented to the right hemisphere (LVF), but there were no significant hemispheric effects for happy emotional valence. For lows there were no hemispheric differences. Gender was a nonsignificant factor. Significant correlations showed that faster reaction times to angry and happy stimuli, in both LVF and RVF in waking and hypnosis, were obtained by subjects who reported more deeply absorbed and extremely focused and sustained attention on the Tellegen (1982) Absorption Scale and a subscale of the Differential Attentional Processes Inventory (Grumbles & Crawford, 1981). Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (Marks, 1973) and Affect Intensity Measure (Larsen, 1985), in general, did not correlate with RTs. The potential role of the fronto-limbic attentional system in the recognition of external visual sensory affect is discussed.
Spiegel, David (1995, November). Neurophysiological effects of hypnotic perceptual alteration. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, San Antonio, TX.
We studied the relationship between selective attention and hypnotic processes. Michael Posner’s theory has different centers for different kinds of attentional processes. Posterior (anterior to the occipital) cortex seems related to arousal. Anterior system has 2 loci: anterior cingulate and [missed words] pole, which relates to the narrowing of attention in hypnosis. We used cued target detection tasks, with MRI measures.
We think hypnotic attention is related to the anterior system.
In an earlier study we used 10 Highs, measured their visual ERPs, with both hypnotic obstructive hallucination and normal attention conditions. We found early and late evoked potential wave component differences: P100, P200, and P300. We were surprised by the P100 or attentional component.
Steven Hilliard’s work used an ERP model, and an attentional paradigm with only 1/2 visual field involved. Usually N1 and P1 loci of EEG are the most affected in attentional studies using the evoked response potential measure.
He compared hypnotic attention with hypnotic obstruction (which was a suggestion that a brick wall was “covering” the L or R visual field). They found a difference between attended and igWe studied the relationship between selective attention and hypnotic processes. Michael Posner’s theory has different centers for different kinds of attentional processes. Posterior (anterior to the occipital) cortex seems related to arousal. Anterior system has 2 loci: anterior cingulate and [missed words] pole, which relates to the narrowing of attention in hypnosis. We used cued target detection tasks, with MRI measures.
We think hypnotic attention is related to the anterior system.
In an earlier study we used 10 Highs, measured their visual ERPs, with both hypnotic obstructive hallucination and normal attention conditions. We found early and late evoked potential wave component differences: P100, P200, and P300. We were surprised by the P100 or attentional component.
Steven Hilliard’s work used an ERP model, and an attentional paradigm with only 1/2 visual field involved. Usually N1 and P1 loci of EEG are the most affected in attentional studies using the evoked response potential measure.
He compared hypnotic attention with hypnotic obstruction (which was a suggestion that a brick wall was “covering” the L or R visual field). They found a difference between attended and ignored stimuli in the Frontal area ERP!
However, there are problems with ERPs and localization due to diffusion of signal throughout the scalp.
In a hypnotic obstruction condition the effect is a bit later than in selective inattention; and it is more posterior than in selective inattention. Thus, if we find a difference due to hypnotic obstruction at P100, it may be due to selective inattention. The difference we can produce with hypnotic obstruction comes at P200 and posterior in the occipital cortex, where a visual stimulus is processed. Generation of internal images may contribute. Are there differences if you tell yourself not to see vs to see something obstructing the image?
Ability to do the hypnotic obstruction is related to the eyeroll item on the Hypnotic Induction Profile (HIP). (High eyeroll score makes it easier to reduce P200 amplitude in response to the obstruction suggestion.) So eyeroll score on the HIP has some validation as a biological marker.
Effects of supportive group therapy for cancer patients study: anxiety and depression modulate the pain more than the location of the cancer. Melzack’s theory indicates input from cortex can modulate pain. We taught Self Hypnosis for pain control: used metaphors that induce relaxation, suggestions to filter hurt out of the pain, not fight the pain, focus on a competing sensation. By end of year the intervention group had half the pain that the non-intervention group had. The frequency and duration of pain attacks were not different.
We are now in year 5 of a 10 year replication study.
nored stimuli in the Frontal area ERP!
However, there are problems with ERPs and localization due to diffusion of signal throughout the scalp.
In a hypnotic obstruction condition the effect is a bit later than in selective inattention; and it is more posterior than in selective inattention. Thus, if we find a difference due to hypnotic obstruction at P100, it may be due to selective inattention. The difference we can produce with hypnotic obstruction comes at P200 and posterior in the occipital cortex, where a visual stimulus is processed. Generation of internal images may contribute. Are there differences if you tell yourself not to see vs to see something obstructing the image?
Ability to do the hypnotic obstruction is related to the eyeroll item on the Hypnotic Induction Profile (HIP). (High eyeroll score makes it easier to reduce P200 amplitude in response to the obstruction suggestion.) So eyeroll score on the HIP has some validation as a biological marker.
Effects of supportive group therapy for cancer patients study: anxiety and depression modulate the pain more than the location of the cancer. Melzack’s theory indicates input from cortex can modulate pain. We taught Self Hypnosis for pain control: used metaphors that induce relaxation, suggestions to filter hurt out of the pain, not fight the pain, focus on a competing sensation. By end of year the intervention group had half the pain that the non-intervention group had. The frequency and duration of pain attacks were not different.
We are now in year 5 of a 10 year replication study.
ignored stimuli in the Frontal area ERP!
However, there are problems with ERPs and localization due to diffusion of signal throughout the scalp.
In a hypnotic obstruction condition the effect is a bit later than in selective inattention; and it is more posterior than in selective inattention. Thus, if we find a difference due to hypnotic obstruction at P100, it may be due to selective inattention. The difference we can produce with hypnotic obstruction comes at P200 and posterior in the occipital cortex, where a visual stimulus is processed. Generation of internal images may contribute. Are there differences if you tell yourself not to see vs to see something obstructing the image?
Ability to do the hypnotic obstruction is related to the eyeroll item on the Hypnotic Induction Profile (HIP). (High eyeroll score makes it easier to reduce P200 amplitude in response to the obstruction suggestion.) So eyeroll score on the HIP has some validation as a biological marker.
Effects of supportive group therapy for cancer patients study: anxiety and depression modulate the pain more than the location of the cancer. Melzack’s theory indicates input from cortex can modulate pain. We taught Self Hypnosis for pain control: used metaphors that induce relaxation, suggestions to filter hurt out of the pain, not fight the pain, focus on a competing sensation. By end of year the intervention group had half the pain that the non-intervention group had. The frequency and duration of pain attacks were not different.
We are now in year 5 of a 10 year replication study.
1993
Atkinson, Richard P. (1993, October). Shifts in Muller-Lyer Illusion difference thresholds: Are high hypnotizables more sensitive than lows in hypnosis?. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, Arlington Heights, IL.
Refers to Wallace (1979) finding that hypnotizability correlates with afterimage persistence. Atkinson showed highs perform better than lows in perceptual tasks in hypnosis only. Also studies indicate highs are more susceptible to illusions. Our study showed difference in threshold and point of subjective equality for highs and lows.
32 undergraduates had Harvard and Group Stanford Form C, were 9-12 or 0-3 on both scales. Counterbalanced conditions of waking and hypnosis. Used computer monitor to compare length of lines. Waking condition Ss had to close eyes for 15 minutes before the trials, same length of time as for hypnosis condition.
Significant interaction between hypnotizability and sessions was observed: highs had significantly decreased difference thresholds in hypnosis compared to waking, and significantly decreased difference thresholds compared to lows in hypnosis. Thus they had greater sensitivity than lows.
The point of subjective equality ANOVA did not yield significant effects.
Highs show higher sensitivity to illusion in hypnosis than in waking, and more than the lows.
McCormack, K.; Gruzelier, J. (1993). Cerebral asymmetry and hypnosis: A signal-detection analysis of divided visual field stimulation. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 102 (3), 352-357.
These authors studied the effect of hypnosis on brightness discrimination with the aid of a signal-detection procedure in three sessions, the second with hypnosis. After two or three training sessions with hypnosis, which involved listening to a taped hypnotic relaxation induction, subjects were subdivided into high- and medium-susceptible groups on the
-jects were subdivided into high- and medium-susceptible groups on the basis of a ‘scale inspired by the Stanford Scales.’ High-susceptible subjects were found to show increases in perceptual sensitivity in the left visual field (right hemisphere) with hypnosis, whereas medium-susceptible subjects showed bilateral enhancements. The attitudes, or criterion set by the subjects remained invariant in both groups across the three sessions. It was concluded that the results provided evidence of altered brain function with hypnosis and an association of focal right hemispheric changes with high susceptibility, and through the invariance of motivational factors, failed to support the attribution of perceptual changes to attitudinal, non-state factors
Wallace, Benjamin (1993, October). The importance of considering imagery in hypnosis research. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, Arlington Heights, IL.
We looked at both hypnotizability (Harvard Scale) and imagery (Vividness of Imagery – Marks) ability in an embedded words task (like the letter matrices in newspapers). Ss were grouped on both variables, forming four groups: high-high, high- low, low-high, and low-low.
Search time in the embedded figures task was greatest for low-lows and least for high-Highs, whether the words are easy, average, or difficult. A list of the possible words was also provided.
Strategies the subjects in different groups used are different. High-high’s use holistic (Crawford) or efficient (Wallace) strategies–studying the list of possible solutions as if storing the words in long-term memory. Low-low’s seem to use the list as a check-off list.
Embedded in the matrix were false alarm words, that weren’t on the list. The low- lows were also prone to more of these errors. Getting rid of those false alarm trials, when presented with matrices with no false alarms, we still get a differences in search time with the same relationship as before.
CONCLUSION. It’s insufficient to simply look at hypnotic susceptibility as there’s an imaging component, a memory or a storage component that we should examine. The percent of variance associated with the embedded figures task success was the same– 20%–for each ability. The correlation between the two (imaging ability and hypnotizability) was significant at .26.
1992
Atkinson, Richard P.; Crawford, Helen J. (1992). Individual differences in afterimage persistence: Relationships to hypnotic susceptibility and visuospatial skills. American Journal of Psychology, 105 (4), 527-539.
To investigate the moderating role of individual differences in hypnotic susceptibility and visuospatial skills on afterimage persistence, we presented a codable (cross) flash of light to 40 men and 46 women who had been dark adapted for 20 minutes. In an unrelated classroom setting, subjects had previously been given two standardized scales of hypnotic susceptibility (Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Shor & Orne, 1962; Group Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale, Form C, Crawford & Allen, 1982) and the Mental Rotations Test (Vandenberg & Kuse, 1978). The first afterimage interval and the afterimage duration correlated significantly with hypnotic responsiveness, supporting Wallace (1979), but did not show the anticipated relationships with mental rotation visuospatial skills. Individuals in the high hypnotizable group had (a) significantly longer afterimage intervals between its first appearance and first disappearance than did those in low groups, but those in medium groups did not differ significantly from the other groups. Discriminant analysis using the afterimage persistence measures classified correctly 65.2% of high hypnotizables, 37.5% of medium hypnotizables, and 54.8% of low hypnotizables. Hypothesized cognitive skills that assist in the maintenance of afterimages and underlie hypnotic susceptibility include abilities to maintain focused attention and resist distractions over time and to maintain vivid visual images.
“Because there is no apparent evidence for physiological differences of the visual system between low and high hypnotizables (e.g., Wallace, 1979), cognitive factors are suggested as possible moderators of afterimage persistence.
“Hypnotic susceptibility per se is not the moderator of afterimage duration. Rather, we argue that hypnotic susceptibility represents a constellation of underlying cognitive skills (e.g., for reviews, see Crawford, 1989; Kihlstrom, 1985) that assist an individual to respond to hypnotic suggestions as well as assist in the persistence of afterimages by interacting with more primary casual mechanisms that are physiological in origin. These cognitive skills are thought to include the abilities to focus attention selectively upon both external stimuli and internally generated images, to maintain vivid visual images, to sustain attention over time and remain absorbed in the experience at hand, and to resist distractions. The relationships between these cognitive skills and hypnotic susceptibility are reported in a large body of literature (e.g., Crawford, 1982, 1989; Crawford et al., 1991; Crawford & Grumbles, 1988; Finke & Macdonald, 1978; Grumbles & Crawford, 1981; Mitchell, 1970; Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974)….
“Sustained and selective attention without interference from extraneous stimuli plays an important role in hypnosis. Individuals who are responsive to hypnosis demonstrate greater skills in extremely focused and sustained attention (e.g., Crawford et al., 1991; Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974). Electrophysiological research had found that high hypnotizables often generate substantially more theta electroencephalogram (EEG) power than do low hypnotizables (e.g., Crawford 1990, 1991; Crawford & Gruzelier, 1992; Sabourin, Cutcomb, Crawford, & Pribam, 1990). Such a relationship may be interpreted as further evidence of greater attentional skills in highs, because certain theta waves have been correlated with enhanced problem solving and attentional task performance (e.g., Crawford & Gruzelier, 1992; Schacter, 1977)….
“Hypnosis is seen often as a condition of amplified attention, where attention can be either more focused or diffuse dependent upon set (e.g., Krippner & Binder, 1974). Increases in vigilant performance during hypnosis have been reported, albeit inconsistently (e.g., Barabasz, 1980; Fehr & Stern, 1967; Kissen, Reifler, & Thaler, 1964; Smyth & Lowy, 1983). Fehr and Stern’s results suggest that hypnotized subjects devote more attention to a primary task with less available attentional resources for a secondary task. Hypnosis has been found to have an enhancing effect on the imaginal processing of information-to-be-remembered that consists of literal or untransformed representations of pictorial or nonverbal information for high but not low hypnotizables (Crawford & Allen, 1983; Crawford, Nomura, & Slater, 1983; Crawford, Wallace, Nomura, & Slater, 1986). This may possibly be the result of increased attention and/or shifts in cognitive strategies. Supportive of the hypothesis that sustained attention can be enhanced during hypnosis, Atkinson (1991) recently found that high but not low hypnotizables report significantly more persistent afterimages in hypnosis than in waking.
“Although we have argued for a cognitive explanation for individual differences in afterimage persistence and their possible relationship to hypnotic susceptibility and sustained attentional abilities, as has Wallace (1979, 1990), we must point out the possibility that high hypnotizables may be more suggestible to imagery instructions or more willing to discuss or experience imagery than low hypnotizables, particularly in the context of hypnosis and hypnotic susceptibility testing (e.g., Zamansky, Scharf, & Brightbill, 1964). A contextual account of the longstanding relationship between hypnotic susceptibility and absorption was raised by Council, Kirsch, and Hafner (1986), but was not supported by two independent, and more methodologically sound, studies reported by Nadon, Hoyt, Register, and Kihlstrom (1991). The context of hypnosis was not an issue in the present study, because none of the subjects was aware of the investigated relationship between afterimage persistence and hypnotic susceptibility at the time of recruitment or participation” (pp. 533-535).
imagery than low hypnotizables, particularly in the context of hypnosis and hypnotic susceptibility testing (e.g., Zamansky, Scharf, & Brightbill, 1964). A contextual account of the longstanding relationship between hypnotic susceptibility and absorption was raised by Council, Kirsch, and Hafner (1986), but was not supported by two independent, and more methodologically sound, studies reported by Nadon, Hoyt, Register, and Kihlstrom (1991). The context of hypnosis was not an issue in the present study, because none of the subjects was aware of the investigated relationship between afterimage persistence and hypnotic susceptibility at the time of recruitment or participation” (pp. 533-535).
Bruner, Jerome (1992). Another look at New Look 1. American Psychologist, 47, 780-783.
New Look 1 was not initially about the unconscious. It was the new mentalism on its way to becoming the Cognitive Revolution. Its subsequent concern with “unconscious defense mechanisms,” although useful, was not its main theoretical thrust. Its principal questions have always been how and where selective processes operate in perception. Obviously, many such processes are unconscious, for consciously guided attention and search become automatized easily in use. And they are fairly flexible as well. So how smart is “the unconscious”? Not very, but a big help anyway.
Greenwald, Anthony G. (1992). New Look 3: Unconscious cognition reclaimed. American Psychologist, 47, 766-779.
Recent research has established several empirical results that are widely agreed to merit description in terms of unconscious cognition. These findings come from experiments that use indirect tests for immediate or long- term residues of barely perceptible, perceptible-but-unattended, or attended-but-forgotten events. Importantly, these well-established phenomena–insofar as they occur without initially involving focal attention–are limited to relatively minor cognitive feats. Unconscious cognition is now solidly established in empirical research, but it appears to be intellectually much simpler than the sophisticated agency portrayed in psychoanalytic theory. The strengthened position of unconscious cognitive phenomena can be related to their fit with the developing neural network (connectionist) theoretical framework in psychology.
Jacoby, Larry L.; Lindsay, D. Stephen; Toth, Jeffrey P. (1992). Unconscious influences revealed: Attention, awareness, and control. American Psychologist, 47, 802-809.
Recent findings of dissociations between direct and indirect tests of memory and perception have renewed enthusiasm for the study of unconscious processing. The authors argue that such findings are heir to the same problems of interpretation as are earlier evidence of unconscious influences–namely, one cannot eliminate the possibility that conscious processes contaminated the measure of unconscious processes. To solve this problem, the authors define unconscious influences in terms of lack of conscious control and then describe a process dissociation procedure that yields separate quantitative estimates of the concurrent contributions of unconscious and consciously controlled processing to task performance. This technique allows one to go beyond demonstrating the existence of unconscious processes to examine factors that determine their magnitude.
In response to Greenwald’s article on contemporary research on unconscious mental processes, the authors address three issues: (a) the independence of much recent research and theory from psychodynamic formulations; (b) the broad sweep of the psychological unconscious, including implicit perception, memory, thought, learning, and emotion; and (c) the possibility that the analytic power of unconscious processing may depend both on the manner in which mental contents are rendered unconscious and the manner in which they are to be processed.
Lewicki, Pawel; Hill, Thomas; Czyzewska, Maria (1992). Nonconscious acquisition of information. American Psychologist, 47, 796-801
The authors review and summarize evidence for the process of acquisition of information outside of conscious awareness (covariations, nonconscious indirect and interactive inferences, self-perpetuation of procedural knowledge). Data indicate that as compared with consciously controlled cognition, the nonconscious information – acquisition processes are not only much faster but are also structurally more sophisticated, in that they are capable of efficient processing of multidimensional and interactive relations between variables. Those mechanisms of non- conscious acquisition of information provide a major channel for the development of procedural knowledge that is indispensable for such important aspects of cognitive functioning as encoding and interpretation of stimuli and the triggering of emotional reactions.
Merikle, Philip M. (1992). Perception without awareness: Critical issues. American Psychologist, 47, 792-795.
This is the introduction to a group of articles. “To a large extent, this entire controversy over perception without awareness has centered on the issue, What constitutes an adequate behavioral measure of conscious perceptual experience? Depending upon one’s answer to this question, the evidence for perception without awareness is either overwhelming or nonexistent.
The distinction is much more significant and interesting if conscious and unconscious processes lead to qualitatively different consequences than if unconscious processes are simply quantitatively weaker versions of unconscious processes. Three different qualitative differences have been established: 1. Groeger (1984, 1988) has demonstrated that words are coded differently depending on whether they are perceived with or without awareness. 2. Stroop effect research showed that prediction based on stimulus redundancy only occurs when subjects consciously perceive the predictive stimuli (Cheesman & Merikle, 1986). The fact that the color word predicted the name of the color patch on 75% of the trials was only used by the subjects to facilitate naming of the color patches when the words were clearly visible. 3. Marcel (1980) showed that conscious awareness is necessary for the selection of a context-relevant interpretation of a stimulus.
The important findings are that performance differs qualitatively across the aware and nonaware conditions
Rondi, Glenys (1992, October). Postoperative impact of information presented during general anesthesia. [Paper] Presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, Arlington, VA.
We tried to improve on the methodology in the literature. Thus we included a limited range of surgery procedures; standardized anesthesia; monitoring of anesthesia; suggestions that were only positive (the suggestions did not mention pain or nausea); patient-controlled analgesia in order to have a more accurate measure; and hypnotizability was measured. They do not equate the hypnotic state with the anesthesia state, but there may be an overlap in the ability to perceive and respond to suggestions in these two states.
All hysterectomy and bilateral [missed word …ectomy] patients were approached, excluding those without English language, etc.
Bowers and she phrased simple, positive suggestions to maximize benefits; Suggestions lasted 3 minutes, and were repeated 3 times on a 60 minute tape. Brief melodies alternated with suggestions or with silence. Conditions included: 1. Suggestions 2. Melody 3. Suggestions + melody 4. Blank tape
Half of the tapes contained suggestions; half not. It was a counterbalanced design. Double blind ratings were made by students.
State-trait Anxiety and Profile of Mood States were measured before surgery. Patients were reminded to listen to suggestions for recovery just before they fell asleep. MDs ordered premedication for the surgery “only if very necessary.”
Patients rated their own recovery as -3 worse than expected to +3 better than expected; and completed a visual analogue scale. Then 24 hours later the researchers asked them if they remembered the tape, and if they had been given suggestions or not.
On Day 5 post operation they administered the Stanford C hypnotizability scale.
RESULTS. None of the patients recalled or dreamed anything that could be attributed to the period of anesthesia. There was a response bias to say “Yes” to “Did you have suggestions?” (34 of Suggestion patients and 28 of non-suggestion patients said “Yes” and there were 48 in each group. Taking response bias into consideration, patients with suggestions were above chance in saying “Yes” to “Did you have suggestions?”
Only 73 of the 96 completed the hypnotizability scale. Duration of the tape (therefore of surgery) was longer for the suggestion group (90 vs 72 minutes). So authors also did a univariate measure.
They divided morphine use by patient weight for each post operative day. The difference in dose for suggestion and no suggestion groups did not reach significance on Day 1 but on Day 2 patients who had suggestions used significantly less morphine.
The correlation matrix showed that patient age was negatively correlated with morphine use; subjected to 1-way ANOVA of covariance; the effect of suggestions remains significant.
Surgery time was covaried out, as it was associated with more negative post operative symptoms; patient age was a second covariate. None of the main effects or 2- way interactions were significant.
Hypnotizability, suggestion group, and their interaction were analyzed. Neither hypnotizability nor its interaction with suggestion contributed to any outcome variable.
Using only highs (13) and lows (12) for another analysis and 2×2 ANOVAS to examine suggestion by hypnotizability. Highs used significantly less morphine in the first hours, whether or not they received suggestions.
Even when weight is taken into account, hypnotizability accounted for significant amount of variance in first 24 hours. Highly hypnotizables’ guesses about whether they were played a tape with suggestions was 100% accurate; guesses of lows were 42% accurate.
with suggestions was 100% accurate; guesses of lows were 42% accurate.
CONCLUSIONS. Some patients show evidence of hearing, and of responding to suggestions. Hypnotic ability did not mediate the response; but patients with high ability showed 100% accuracy in guessing whether they were played suggestions, in the absence of confidence in their response. They may be particularly sensitive to their environment during general anesthesia.
Schacter, Daniel L. (1992). Understanding implicit memory. American Psychologist, 47 (4), 559-569.
Dissociations between implicit and explicit memory have attracted considerable attention in recent memory research. A central issue concerns whether such dissociations require the postulation of separate memory systems or are best understood in terms of different processes operating within a single system. This article presents a cognitive neuroscience approach to implicit memory in general and the systems-processes debate in particular, which draws on evidence from research with brain-damaged patients, neuroimaging techniques, and nonhuman primates. The article illustrates how a cognitive neuroscience orientation can help to supply a basis for postulating memory systems, can provide useful constraints for processing views, and can encourage the use of research strategies that the author refers to as cross-domain hypothesis testing and cross-domain hypothesis generation, respectively. The cognitive neuroscience orientation suggests a complementary role for multiple systems and processing approaches.
“Implicit memory is an unintentional, nonconscious form of retention that can be contrasted with explicit memory, which involves conscious recollection of previous experiences” (p. 559). The author provides examples of memory dissociations, some of them from neuropathology and some from experimental psychology.
Different brain systems may account for some of the dissociations. For example, there are “studies of patients who show relatively intact access to perceptual-structural knowledge of words or objects, despite severely impaired access to semantic knowledge of the same items. … Similarly, studies of lexical processing using positron emission tomography (PET) indicate that visual word form information and semantic information are handled by separate brain regions. … These kinds of observations suggest the existence of a perceptual representation system (PRS)” (p. 561). .
“Marsolek et al. (1992) drew on independent evidence from cognitive neuroscience concerning the characteristics of the hemispheres to argue that a left hemisphere subsystem computes abstract word form representations that do not preserve specific features of particular inputs, whereas a right-hemisphere subsystem computes perceptually specific word form representations (in the present terminology, both could be viewed as PRS subsystems)” (p. 562)..
“Our approach to auditory implicit memory was guided by neuropsychological studies of patients who exhibit dissociations between access to form and semantic information in the auditory domain that are similar to those discussed earlier in the visual domain. … More specifically, patients with so-called word meaning deafness are unable to understand spoken words (e.g. Ellis & Young, 1988). However, they can repeat spoken words quite well and show some ability to write words to dictation, thus suggesting that they can gain access to stored auditory word from representations. … Rather more frequently encountered are patients with transcortical sensory aphasia (e.g. Kertesz, Sheppard, & MacKenzie, 1982),
), who exhibit spared abilities to repeat spoken words and write them to dictation, together with impaired comprehension. In these patients, however, the comprehension deficit is also observed in other modalities, thus indicating damage to the semantic system itself.
“These dissociations point toward the existence of a PRS subsystem that handles information about auditory word forms separately from semantic information (cf. Ellis & Young, 1988)” (p. 565)..
“Various investigators have argued that auditory processing differs in the two hemispheres: The left hemisphere relies on categorical or abstract auditory information and operates primarily on phonemes, whereas the right hemisphere relies more on ‘acoustic gestalts’ and operates primarily on prosodic features of speech, including voice information… In addition, studies of normal subjects using dichotic listening techniques have shown a left-ear (i.e., right-hemisphere) advantage for certain types of voice information, in contrast to the usual right-ear advantage for speech” (p. 566).
Wallace, Benjamin; Kokoszka, Andrzej (1992). Experience of peripheral temperature change during hypnotic analgesia. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 40, 180-193.
Many Subjects who experience hypnotic analgesia in a portion of their body often report that it is accompanied by sensations of coldness in the affected area. Experiments were conducted to determine if such reports are the result of a physical change in peripheral temperature or are due to psychological factors. When analgesia was induced in a limb or in the back of the neck, a concomitant physical change in temperature was not observed. Subjects did report experiencing coldness, however, in the affected body part. Such experiences were attributed to associations that Subjects developed between numbness or analgesia and a drop in peripheral temperature. As a result, coldness as an associate of hypnotic analgesia is suggested as a manipulation check for the presence of such sensation reduction.
When a limb feels numb, there also appears to be degradation of proprioceptive abilities (Wallace & Garrett, 1973, 1975; Wallace & Hoyenga, 1980). When Ss are asked to touch their nose with finger, either subjects miss the nose or they take longer to do the task. This kind of proprioceptive decrement has also been reported by Spanos, Gorassini, and Petrusic (1981) and Welch (1978, p. 27).
This study used highly hypnotizable Ss (10-12 on Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Form A (HGSHS:A) and low hypnotizables (0-2) in Experiment 1 which established temperature variability in an arm and sites for measuring temperature during hypnotic analgesia.
In Experiment 2, 40 subjects (20 highs and 20 lows by above standards, with group assignment confirmed by Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale, Form C, on which highs M = 10.4, lows M = 1.2) were given relaxation imagery (e.g. to imagine a white, fluffy cloud gently moving across a deep, blue sky during a count of 20, while at the same time, listening only to the voice of E describing the scene to them.
The analgesia suggestion was that “their right arm had been injected with massive doses of Novocain, that Novocain had been injected in their shoulder, in their elbow, in their forearm, in their hand, and in their fingers … their arm would become progressively more and more numb as E counted backward from 20 to 1” (p. 185; for more details see Wallace & Hoyenga, 1981). They were asked to perform the nose touch test as confirmation of the analgesia suggestion response
They were asked to perform the nose touch test as confirmation of the analgesia suggestion response.
Highs and lows who served as control subjects had the same treatment except instead of analgesia instructions they were told their arm would become progressively more and more relaxed as E counted backwards from 20 to 1.
The peripheral skin temperature was monitored during the procedures, and following the experimental manipulation Ss completed a questionnaire on their experience of numbness, heaviness, changes in limb temperature (very warm to very cold), and changes in mobility.
Analyses of variance were used to analyze the results. Although there were no objective skin temperature changes, there was a significant interaction effect for pointing error. Highs who received analgesia suggestions were off 4.35 cm; the other 3 groups had mean error of .45 cm or less. There was also an interaction effect for latency of response: highs with analgesia instructions took 3.05 seconds longer than in relaxation condition, while other three groups only took .27 sec longer, on average. Additionally, there was a correlation between receiving analgesia instructions and feeling limb heaviness for the high hypnotizables (r = .68) but not for lows or for any Ss asked to relax their arm during the procedures.
The sensation of coldness was reported by the majority of highs receiving analgesia suggestions (7 of 10), but 2 Ss scoring 12 on the SHSS:C did not report coldness. Cold sensation was not reported by any S in any of the three other groups. The correlations between cold sensation and heaviness (r = .65, p<.05) and cold sensation and immobility (r = .79, p<.05) were found only in the High hypnotizable, analgesia suggestion group.
The authors performed a third experiment to determine whether temperature change could be used to confirm analgesia. This would be useful when one cannot confirm with inability to move the body part, e.g. when the analgesia is being developed in a part of the body that usually doesn't move. The design for Experiment 3 was the same as for Experiment 2.
Analgesia rated on a 7-point scale was reported as 6.1 by high hypnotizables and 1.2 by low hypnotizables. "Reports of a temperature change during the induction were also related to hypnotic analgesia and being classified as high in hypnotizability. Such a relationship was only significant, however, for a feeling of coldness (r = .63, p <.05), and 7 of the 10 high hypnotizable Subjects assigned to the analgesia group reported the aforementioned sensation. A significant experiencing of a temperature change (cold or warm) was not reported by the other three groups of Subjects" (p. 189).
In their Discussion, the authors suggest that expectancy might account for the results, since during post-experiment interviews many Ss said that they expected their arm would become cold when it was numb. That was based on their previous experience, e.g. in placing ice on the skin. Notable, people did not exhibit this association if they were not able to develop the analgesia in response to suggestion.
The authors also take note of the fact that none of the Subjects reported associating cold with pain, though cold and pain often are concurrently experienced. This might be because only extreme cold is painful, and coolness might actually be perceived as pleasant.
1991
Brown, Jason W. (1991). Self and process: Brain states and the conscious present. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Author, from the Department of Neurology at New York University Medical School, presents a theory about the genetic unfolding of mental content (mind) through stages, from mental state into consciousness or into behavior. He relates the genesis of mind to brain development but avoids assuming that there is a straightforward correlation between brain development (e.g. myelination) and cognitive development or perception. To some degree, the theory is based on subjective report data and psychological symptoms. The author discusses issues that bear on the phenomena of nonvoluntary responding and dissociation that are reported or described by hypnotized persons.
"The nature of the mental state will determine the relation between self and world, and thus the interpretation given to agency and choice. ... The crossing of the boundary from self to world is a shift from one level in mind to another" (pp. 10-11).
"... if we begin with mind as primary and seek to explain objects from inner states and private experience, the discontinuity between inner and outer evaporates: mind is everywhere, a universe. ... Whereas before we thought to perceive objects, now we understand that we think them" (p. 19).
"The concept of a stratified cognition is central to the notion of a mental state .... This entails an unfolding from depth to surface, not from one surface to the next, a direction crucial to agency and the causal or decisional properties of consciousness" (p. 52). By unfolding from depth to surface, he means from Core, through Subconscious, then Conscious Private Events, and finally Extra-Personal Space.
He goes on to provide a definition of mental states. "A mental state is the minimal state of a mind, an absolute unit from the standpoint of its spatial and temporal structure. ... The state also has to include the prehistory of the organism. ... The concept of a mental state implies a fundamental unit that has gestalt-like properties, in that specific contents-- words, thoughts, percepts--appear in the context of mind as a whole (p. 53).
"The entire multitiered system arborizes like a tree, with levels in each component linked to corresponding levels in other components. For example, an early (e.g., limbic) state in language (e.g., word meaning) is linked to an early stage in action (e.g., drive, proximal motility) and perception (e.g., hallucination, personal memory) .... In sum, a description of the spatial and temporal features of a _single_ unfolding series amounts to a description of the minimal unit of mind, the _absolute_ mental state" (p. 54).
The author's discussion of an individual's physical movement relates to the concept of nonvoluntary movement (or movement without awareness of volition) in hypnosis. "More precisely, levels in the brain state constitute the action structure. As it unfolds, this structure generates the conviction that a self-initiated act has occurred. This structure--the action representation--does not elaborate content in consciousness. ... As with the sensory-perceptual interface, the transition to movement occurs across an abrupt boundary. In some manner, perhaps through a translation of cognitive rhythms in the action to kinetic patterns in the movement, levels in the emerging act discharge into motor (physical) events" (p. 57).
"The self has the nature of a global image or early representation within which objects-to-be are embedded. ... The self is the accumulation of all the momentary cognitions developing in a brain configured by heredity and experience in a particular way (p. 70).
"The deposition of a holistic representation ... creates the deception of a self that stands behind and propagates events. The feeling of the self as an agent is reinforced by the forward thrust of the process and the deeper locus of the self in relation to surface objects. The self appears to be an instigator of acts and images when in fact it is given up in their formation. The self does not cause or initiate, it only anticipates (p. 70).
The foregoing notes cover only the first five chapters, less than half the book. Other chapters relevant to hypnosis would be those titled 'The Nature of Voluntary Action,' 'Psychology of Time Awareness,' 'From Will to Compassion,' and 'Mind and Brain.'
cause or initiate, it only anticipates (p. 70).
The foregoing notes cover only the first five chapters, less than half the book. Other chapters relevant to hypnosis would be those titled 'The Nature of Voluntary Action,' 'Psychology of Time Awareness,' 'From Will to Compassion,' and 'Mind and Brain.'
Dixon, Norman F.; Henley, Susan H. (1991). Unconscious perception: Possible implications of data from academic research for clinical practice. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 179 (5), 243-252.
Evidence for the reality of unconscious perception and perceptual defense suggests that the experimental paradigms used to investigate these phenomena might play a role in the understanding and treatment of mental disorders. The literature on applying subliminal stimulation to problems of diagnosis and therapy indicates that data support the view that the meaning of external stimuli of which the recipient is unaware may be responded to and determine emotional responses, lexical decisions, overt behavior, and subjective experience. Data confirm the reality of psychopathology as a substrate of emotionally colored, stored information with a potential for producing somatic symptoms and disorders of thinking, affect, and behavior. To the extent that psychopathology is screened from conscious scrutiny and thus impervious to supraliminal information, it may be accessed and ameliorated by drive-related stimuli of which the S is not aware.
Kunzendorf, Robert G.; Beltz, Susan McLaughlin; Tymowicz, Gina (1991-92). Self-awareness in autistic subjects and deeply hypnotized subjects: Dissociation of self-concept versus self-consciousness. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 11, 129-141.
By refining past tests of self-awareness in mirrors, current testing demonstrates that autistic subjects' percepts are dissociated from self-concept, whereas hypnotized subjects' sensations are dissociated from self-consciousness. In the current test of self-concept, subjects could not _directly_ see a line inside the box on their lap, but subjects could see the line _indirectly_ in a televised mirror image. When instructed to touch the line, autistic subjects reached towards the televised line, whereas nonautistic subjects reached towards the actual line occluded inside the box. This first result suggests that the autistic subject's visual percept of the televised line is dissociated from its spatial relationship to the subject's self-concept. In the current test of self-consciousness, subjects were told to use a televised mirror-image to move their hands together until touching, but were not told that they were actually seeing a pre-recorded tape of their hands struggling unsuccessfully to touch. When queried, hypnotized subjects denied that their tactually joined hands were touching, whereas nonhypnotized subjects confirmed that their hands were touching. This latter result suggests that the hypnotized subject's hand-touching sensations are dissociated from the immediate and incontrovertible self-consciousness _that one is perceiving the hands touching (not imaging them touching)_.
Nelson, Peter L. (1991-92). Personality attributes as discriminating factors in distinguishing religio-mystical from paranormal experients. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 11, 389-406.
In the first section of this article, an operationalized notion of preternatural experience is described which includes two general classes of experience: religio-mystical (Ontic) and paranormal (Perceptual). The exploratory study which follows uses the personality measures of the complete Tellegen Differential Personality Questionnaire taken from 120 subjects who reported having had spontaneous religio- mystical and/or paranormal experiences at some time in the past. The scores on all eleven primary dimensions, three higher order affect factors, and two validity scales were used individually, in univariate ANOVAs, and together, in a Direct Discriminant Function Analysis, to successfully separate two classes of preternatural experients from non- experients and from each other.
1990